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We develop and extend a line of recent work on the design of mechanisms for two-sided markets. e markets
we consider consist of buyers and sellers of a number of items, and the aim of a mechanism is to improve the
social welfare by arranging purchases and sales of the items. A mechanism is given prior distributions on the
agents’ valuations of the items, but not the actual valuations; thus the aim is to maximise the expected social
welfare over these distributions. As in previous work, we are interested in the worst-case ratio between the
social welfare achieved by a truthful mechanism, and the best social welfare possible.
Our main result is an incentive compatible and budget balanced constant-factor approximation mechanism
in a seing where buyers have XOS valuations and sellers’ valuations are additive. is is the rst such
approximation mechanism for a two-sided market seing where the agents have combinatorial valuation
functions. To achieve this result, we introduce a more general kind of demand query that seems to be needed
in this situation. In the simpler case that sellers have unit supply (each having just one item to sell), we give a
new mechanism whose welfare guarantee improves on a recent one in the literature. We also introduce a
more demanding version of the strong budget balance (SBB) criterion, aimed at ruling out certain “unnatural”
transactions satised by SBB. We show that the stronger version is satised by our mechanisms.
1 INTRODUCTION
One-sided markets have been studied in economics for several decades and more recently in
computer science. Mechanism design in one-sided markets aims to nd an ecient (high-welfare)
allocation of a set of items to a set of agents, while ensuring that truthfully reporting the input data
is the best strategy for the agents. e cornerstone method in mechanism design is the Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [Clarke, 1971, Groves, 1973, Vickrey, 1961] that optimises the
social welfare while providing the right incentives for truth-telling: VCG mechanisms are dominant
strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), and inmanymechanism design seings VCG is also individually
rational (IR). e IR requirement demands that participating in the mechanism is not harmful to any
agent. e DSIC requrement demands that truthfully reporting one’s preferences to the mechanism
is a dominant strategy for each agent, independently of what the other agents report.
Recently, increased aention has turned to the problems that arise in two-sided markets, in which
the set of agents is partitioned into buyers and sellers. In contrast with the one-sided seing (where
one could say that the mechanism itself initially holds the items), in the two-sided seing the items
are initially held by the sellers, who have valuations over the items they hold, and who are assumed
to act rationally and strategically. e mechanism’s task is now to decide which buyers and sellers
should trade, and at which prices. e growing interest in two-sided markets can be aributed to
various important applications. Relevant examples are selling display-ads on ad exchange platforms,
the US FCC spectrum license reallocation, and stock exchanges. Two-sided markets are usually
studied in a Bayesian seing: there is public knowledge of probability distributions, one for each
buyer and one for each seller, from which the valuations of the buyers and sellers are drawn.
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In two-sided markets, a further important requirement is strong budget balance (SBB), which
states that monetary transfers happen only among the agents in the market, i.e., the buyers and
sellers are allowed to trade without leaving to the mechanism any share of the payments, and
without the mechanism adding money to the market. A weaker version of SBB oen considered
in the literature is weak budget balance (WBB), which only requires the mechanism not to inject
money into the market. However, it is known from the work of Myerson and Saerthwaite [1983]
that it is generally impossible for an IR, BIC, and WBB mechanism to maximise social welfare in
such a market, even in the bilateral trade seing, i.e., when there is just one seller and one buyer.1
e practical contexts noted above need the application of two-sided market mechanisms that
can work in a combinatorial seing, i.e., where there are multiple distinct items in the market
and agents having possibly complex valuations over the subsets of items that they may receive.
However, we are not aware of any such mechanism that approximates the social welfare while
meeting the IR, DSIC and SBB requirements. e purpose of this paper is to provide mechanisms
that satisfy these requirements and achieve an O (1)-approximation to the social welfare for a
broad class of agents’ valuation functions. We do, in fact, design mechanisms that work under the
assumption of the valuations being fractionally subadditive (XOS), a generalisation of submodular
functions that are contained in the class of subadditive functions.
Our results extend and improve on previous work which targeted an important special case
of a two-sided market: each seller holds a single item, items are identical, and each agent is only
interested in holding a single item. In this seing, the valuations of the agents are thus given
by a single number, representing the agent’s utility for holding an item. A mechanism for this
seing is known in the literature as a double auction. e goal of several works on double auctions
[McAfee, 1992, Saerthwaite and Williams, 1989, 2002] has been that of trading o the achievable
social welfare with the strength of the incentive compatibility and budget balance constraints. In
our present work, we investigate this question for the much more general class of combinatorial
two-sided markets.
1.1 The Model
As stated above, the set of agents is partitioned into a set of sellers, each of which is initially endowed
with a set of heterogeneous items, and a set of buyers, having no items initially. Buyers have money
that can be used to pay for items. Every agent has its own, private valuation function, which maps
subsets of the items to numbers, and agents are assumed to optimise their (quasi-linear) utility,
which is given by the valuation of the set of items that the mechanism allocates to an agent, minus
the payment that the mechanism collects from the agent. A seller will typically receive money
(instead of pay money), which we treat as a negative payment.
For each agent we are given a (publicly known) probability distribution over a set of valuation
functions, from which we assume her valuation function is drawn. e mechanism and the other
agents have no knowledge of the actual valuation function of the i-th agent, but only of her
probability distribution. e general aim of the mechanism is to reallocate the items so as to
maximise the expected social welfare (the sum of the agents’ valuations of the resulting allocation).
Let OPT be the expected social welfare of an optimal allocation of the items. Note that this is a
well-dened quantity, even though computing an optimal allocation may be computationally hard,
and even though there might not exist an appropriate mechanism (satisfying IR, SBB, and DSIC),
that is guaranteed to always output an optimal allocation.
1e VCG mechanism can also be applied to two-sided markets; however, in this seing, VCG is either not IR or it does not
satisfy WBB.
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We are interested in mechanisms that satisfy IR, SBB, and DSIC (or failing that, the weaker
notion of Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC)), and that reallocate the items in such a way that
the expected social welfare is within some constant fraction of OPT, where expectation is taken
over the given probability distributions of the agents’ valuations, and over the randomness of
the allocation that the mechanism outputs. In contrast with one-sided combinatorial auction
design (where the main challenge is polynomial-time implementability), for the two-sided case our
primary goal is to design (and thus show the existence of) IR, SBB, and DSIC/BIC mechanisms that
O (1)-approximate OPT. Such mechanisms circumvent the aformentioned impossibility result of
Myerson and Saerthwaite [1983] by weakening the requirement of optimal social welfare to that
of approximately optimal social welfare (while nonetheless strengthening the WBB contraint into
SBB).
1.2 Our Results and their Significance
e present paper starts o by showing that there is a straightforward technical trick that one
may apply to turn any WBB mechanism into an SBB one, with a small loss in the approximation
factor. Technically, one could e.g. apply it to the WBB mechanism of Blumrosen and Dobzinski
[2014] for combinatorial exchange markets; however, the trick is unsatisfactory in practice as it
essentially consists of giving the leover money to a random agent. is demonstrates a weakness
in the current denition of SBB, which motivates the introduction of a strengthened version, that
we call direct-trade strong budget balance (DSBB).
Our goal is the design of individually rational, incentive compatible, and direct-trade strongly
budget balanced mechanisms for combinatorial two-sided markets, that achieve a constant approx-
imation to the optimal social welfare. We present two mechanisms adhering to these constraints
for general families of combinatorial two-sided markets, as summarized in the table below.
Mechanism
Buyers’
valuations
Sellers’
valuations
Approximation
ratio
IR IC BB
M1-supply XOS unit-supply 6 ex-post IR DSIC DSBB
Madd XOS additive 6 interim IR BIC DSBB
Madd additive additive 6 ex-post IR DSIC DSBB
Table 1. Summary of our results.
OurM1-supply mechanism handles the seing where all sellers have a single item for sale, and
buyers have fractionally subadditive (XOS) valuation functions over the set of items in the market.
OurMadd mechanism can handle the more general case where sellers have multiple items for sale
and have additive valuation functions over the items they possess, thoughMadd satises weaker
IC and IR notions than M1-supply. More precisely, Madd is DSIC and IR on the sellers’ side and
BIC and interim-IR on the buyers’ side. However, for the special case where buyers have additive
valuation functions,Madd does satisfy the stronger IC and IR notions for both buyers and sellers. In
all three cases, DSBB is satised (a strengthened variant of SBB), and our mechanisms achieve an
O (1)-approximation to the optimal social welfare.
To our knowledge, these are the rst mechanisms for combinatorial two-sided markets that
simultaneously are IC, (D)SBB, IR, and approximate the optimal social welfare to within a constant
factor. Notice that with non-unit-supply sellers, a constant approximation was not previously
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known even in the context of WBB or standard SBB.2 Furthermore, we note that our mechanisms
not only work for a more general seing than that of [Colini-Baldeschi et al., 2016], but also improve
the approximation ratio for double auctions from 16 to 6.
In the case ofMadd, buyers are required to answer a generalised type of demand query, in which
the mechanism gives prices for the items, and asks a buyer which bundle she would like if, for
each item in that bundle, she were to receive it with probability 1/2. Our usage of these queries
could be criticised for imposing an excessive cognitive burden on the agents. Although we are not
concerned here with that issue (we model agents as computationally unbounded as well as rational),
our apparent need for such queries highlights the general question of how agents’ computational
limitations aect what outcomes can be achieved.3
1.3 Overview of the Techniques
e main challenge in two-sided market design is to nd prices that stimulate truthful behavior
and are suitable for both buyers and sellers, which have contrasting interests. In fact, even in the
simplest imaginable seing – the bilateral trade – it is impossible to design a socially ecient
mechanism satisfying IR, BIC and WBB [Myerson and Saerthwaite, 1983].
A rst feature all our mechanisms share to guarantee DSBB is being a generalised version of
two-sided sequential posted price mechanisms (SPMs) [Colini-Baldeschi et al., 2016] for double
auctions to combinatorial two-sided markets. ese mechanisms assign xed, pre-computed prices
to each item so that these prices are the only ones for which the items can be traded. is yields a
sequence of bilateral trades in which the amount paid by the buyer equals the amount received by
the seller.
While one-sided SPMs provide IR and IC for free, two-sided SPMs require additional conditions
to be met. In combinatorial two-sided markets, if prices are xed for every single item, it cannot
be guaranteed that a bundle of items chosen by a buyer will surely be allocated to her, in case
at that point the corresponding seller has not been queried yet about her willingness to sell the
item. Symmetrically, when a seller would communicate to an SPM mechanism which bundle of
items she is willing to sell given the proposed item prices, then the mechanism cannot guarantee
to the seller that this bundle will surely be traded in case it has not yet queried the buyers which
item sets they demand. e situation is further complicated by the fact that there may exist strong
interdependencies among items within an agent’s valuation function, which implies that the choice
of bundle that a buyer requests (or that a seller makes available) depends strongly on the set of
items that the sellers are prepared to sell (or that the buyers request). erefore, a mechanism
designer needs to be careful in proposing prices that are suitable for both sides of the market, and
needs to be particularly careful in selecting the side of the market to process rst. e choice that
the mechanism made here can depend crucially on the types of valuation functions of the agents.
Indeed, one main dierence between our two mechanisms is the order in which we process each
side of the market. Anyway all the mechanisms proposed in this paper are oblivious to the order in
which sellers and buyers are presented.
To additionally achieve a mechanism that results in a high social welfare, we exclude some items
from trade and introduce randomness into the mechanism. e main idea is to suppose that all
the items are available to the set of buyers as in a one-sided auction, and to compute the expected
2e mechanism proposed in [Blumrosen and Dobzinski, 2014] achieves a constant approximation to the optimal social
welfare if the size of the initial endowment of each agent is bounded by a constant; otherwise the approximation factor is of
logarithmic order.
3is question also applies to standard demand queries [Feige and Joseph, 2014], which may be computationally hard to
answer or may involve a high communication complexity, depending on the computational model used and on the way in
which the valuation functions are represented.
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marginal contribution of an item to the social welfare [Feldman et al., 2015] under this assumption.
en, the mechanism compares this contribution to the seller’s value for the item: if the seller’s
value is much higher, then we exclude the item from trade and leave it with the seller. us, the
mechanism only trades items that are of relatively high expected value to the buyers’ side of the
market.
To estimate the expectedmarginal contribution of an item to the social welfare,M1-supply andMadd
make use of an algorithm A that, given a buyers’ valuation prole and a set of items, allocates the
items to the buyers, without considering the sellers and their valuations. If one is not interested in
achieving a low runtime, one can take A to be an exact algorithm that outputs an optimal allocation.
Alternatively, by using a technique of Feldman et al. [2015], one may take for A a polynomial
time approximation algorithm and combine this with sampling a suciently number of valuation
proles from the distribution, in order to estimate the expected marginal contribution of an item
to the social welfare accurately in polynomial time. is yields polynomial-time implementable
approximationmechanisms. In particular, in caseA is a polynomial timeα-approximation algorithm,
it will run within time POLY (1/ϵ ,n,m), and approximate the optimal social welfare within anO (α )
multiplicative factor and an ϵ additive term, where ϵ is a parameter that results from the sampling
procedure. is technique is described in further detail in [Feldman et al., 2015] and works for
distributions with bounded support.
Randomness is added to make sure every seller independently sells her bundle of items with a
xed probability of 1/2; which is used to bound the social welfare loss on both sides of the market
by no more than a constant factor.
1.4 Related Work
Due to the impossibility result of Myerson and Saerthwaite [1983], no two-sided mechanism can
simultaneously achieve optimal social welfare and satisfy the BIC, IR, WBB constraints, even in the
simple bilateral trade seing. Follow-up work thus had to focus on designing mechanisms that
trade o among these properties.
e following papers of the Economics literature studied the convergence rate to the optimal
social welfare as a function of the number of agents when all sellers’ and buyers’ valuations are
independently respectively drawn from identical regular distributions, while satisfying IR and
WBB. Gresik and Saerthwaite [1989] showed that duplicating the number of agents by τ results
in a market where the optimal IR, IC, WBB mechanism’s expected social welfare approximation
factor approaches 1 at a rate ofO (logτ/τ 2). Rustichini et al. [1994] and Saerthwaite and Williams
[2002] investigated a family of non-IC double auctions, and study the ineciency and the extent to
which agents misreport their valuations in these double auctions. We remark that these results
only hold for unit-demand buyers and unit-supply sellers, identical valuation distributions, and
the hidden constants in these asymptotic results depend on the specic valuation distributions. In
contrast, our interest is in nding universal constant approximation guarantees for combinatorial
seings and not necessarily identical distributions.
In McAfee [1992], an IC, WBB, IR double auction is proposed that extracts at least a (1 − 1/`)
fraction of the maximum social welfare, where ` is the number of traders in the optimal solution.
Optimal revenue-maximising Bayesian auctions were characterized in Myerson [1981], which
provides an elegant tool applicable to single-parameter, one-sided auctions. Various subsequent
articles dealt with extending these results. Related to our work is the work of Deng et al. [2014],
which studied maximising the auctioneer’s revenue in Bayesian double auctions. e same objective
was studied by Deshmukh et al. [2002] yet in the prior-free model. In [Segal-Halevi et al., 2016],
mechanisms for some special cases of two-sided markets are presented that work by a combination
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of random sampling and random serial dictatorship. e mechanism is IR, SBB and DSIC and its
gain from trade approaches the optimum when the market is suciently large. Mechanisms that are
IC, IR, and SBB have been given for bilateral trade in [Blumrosen and Dobzinski, 2014]. In addition
to this, the authors proposed a WBB mechanism for a general class of combinatorial exchange
markets. We will use this result to construct our initial mechanism.
Sequential posted price mechanisms (SPMs) in one-sided markets have been introduced by
Sandholm and Gilpin [2004] and have gained aention due to their simplicity, robustness to
collusion, and their easy implementability in practical applications. One of the rst theoretical
results concerning SPMs is an asymptotic comparison among three dierent types of single-
parameter mechanisms [Blumrosen and Holenstein, 2008]. ey were later studied by Chawla et al.
[2010] for the objective of revenue maximisation. Additionally, Kleinberg and Weinberg [2012] and
Du¨ing and Kleinberg [2015] strengthen these results further. Very relevant to our work is the
paper of Feldman et al. [2015], showing that sequential posted price mechanisms can approximate
social welfare up to a constant factor of 1/2 for XOS valuation functions if the published price for
an item is equal to the expected additive contribution of the item to the social welfare.
A line of recent work addressed the problem of approximating social welfare in double auctions
and related problems under the WBB requirement. Du¨ing et al. [2014] indeed proposed a greedy
strategy that combines the one-sided VCG mechanism, independently applied to buyers and
to sellers with the trade-reduction mechanism of McAfee [1992]. ey obtain IR, DSIC, WBB
mechanisms with a good approximation of the social welfare, for knapsack, matching and matroid
allocation constraints. More recently, Colini-Baldeschi et al. [2016] presented the rst double
auction that satises IR, DSIC, and SBB, and approximates the optimal (expected) social welfare
up to a constant factor. ese results hold for any number of buyers and sellers with arbitrary,
independent distributions on valuations. e mechanisms are also extended to the seing where
there is an additional matroid constraint on the set of buyers who can purchase an item.
2 PRELIMINARIES
As a general convention, we use boldface notation for vectors and use [a] to denote the set {1, . . . ,a}.
We will use I(X ) to denote the indicator function that maps to 1 if and only if event/fact X holds.
2.1 Markets
A two-sided market comprises a set of two distinct types of agents: the sellers, who initially hold
items for sale, and the buyers, who are interested in buying the sellers’ items. All agents possess
a monotone and normalized valuation function, mapping subsets of items to R≥0.4 Formally, we
represent a two-sided market as a tuple (n,m,k,I ,G,F ), where [n] denotes the set of buyers, [m]
denotes the set of sellers, [k] denotes the set of all items for sale, I := (I1, . . . , Im ) is a vector of
(mutually disjoint) sets of items called the initial endowment, where Ij is the set of items that
is initially held by seller j ∈ [m]. It holds that ⋃mj=1 Ij = [k]. Vectors G = (G1, . . . ,Gn ) and
F = (F1, . . . ,Fm ) are vectors of probability distributions, from which the buyers’ and sellers’
valuation functions are assumed to be drawn: e valuation function of buyer i ∈ [n] is drawn from
distribution Gi , and similarly the valuation function of seller j ∈ [m] is drawn from distribution Fj .
A (combinatorial) exchange market is a more general version of the above dened two-sided
market where an agent can act as both a buyer and a seller. us, everyone may initially own items
and may both sell and buy items. As a result, in this seing, we override the notation and simply
use n to denote the total number of agents. Formally, an exchange market is thus a tuple (n,k,I ,F ).
4By a monotone valuation function v we mean that v (S ) ≥ v (T ) for all sets of items T ⊆ S . at is, geing more items
cannot decrease an agent’s overall valuation. By normalized we mean that v (∅) = 0.
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In two-sided markets, sellers are assumed to only value items in their initial bundle and are
therefore not interested in buying from other sellers, i.e., ∀j ∈ [m] and ∀S ⊆ [k],w j (S ) = w j (S ∩ Ij ).
Conversely, in exchange markets, no such restriction on the valuation functions exists.
roughout the paper, we reserve the usage of the leer i to denote a single buyer, the leer j to
denote a single seller, and the leer ` to denote a single item. Moreover, we use vi to denote buyer
i’s valuation function andw j to denote seller j’s valuation function.
2.2 Mechanism Design Goals
e following discussion is specic to two-sided markets (the main focus of this paper), but these
concepts can be extended straightforwardly to combinatorial exchange markets. Given a two-sided
market, our aim is to redistribute the items among the agents so as to maximise the social welfare
(the sum of the agents’ valuations). An allocation for a two-sided market (n,m,k,I ,G,F ) is a pair
of vectors (X ,Y ) = ((X1, . . . ,Xn ), (Y1, . . . ,Ym )) such that the union of X1, . . . ,Xn ,Y1, . . . ,Ym is [k],
and X1, . . . ,Xn ,Y1, . . . ,Ym are mutually disjoint. When discussing a given two-sided market, we
will denote by A the set of all allocations for that market.
Redistribution of the items is done by running a mechanismM. A mechanism interacts with and
receives input from the agents, and outputs an outcome, consisting of an allocation (X ,Y ) and a
payment vector (ρB ,ρS ) ∈ Rn × Rm , where ρB refers to the buyers’ vector of payments and ρS to
the sellers’ one. An outcome is therefore a tuple (X ,Y ,ρB ,ρS ). Note that when an agent is charged
a negative payment, this should be interpreted as an agent receiving money. e payment of a
seller is usually negative in a reasonable two-sided market mechanism, and this is also the case for
the mechanisms proposed in the present paper.
Agents are assumed to maximise their utility, which is dened as the valuation for the bundle of
items that they possess with respect to the allocation vector, minus the payment charged by the
mechanism. In particular, the utilityuBi (vi , (X ,Y ,ρB ,ρS )) of a buyer i ∈ [n] with valuation function
vi isvi (Xi )−ρBi , whereas for a seller j ∈ [m] with valuation functionw j it isuSj (w j , (X ,Y ,ρB ,ρS )) =
w j (Yj ) − ρSj .
Furthermore, agents are assumed to be fully rational, so that they will strategically interact with
the mechanism to achieve their goal of maximising utility. Our goal is to design a mechanism
such that there is a dominant strategy or Bayes-Nash equilibrium for the agents under which the
mechanism returns an allocation with a high social welfare. For an allocation (X ,Y ), the social
welfare SW(X ,Y ) is dened as
SW(X ,Y ) =
∑
i ∈[n]
vi (Xi ) +
∑
j ∈[m]
w j (Yj ).
We now describe three main economic properties our mechanisms must satisfy. For each of these
constraints we rst introduce the strictest version and then a more relaxed one. We aim to satisfy
the strictest versions, whenever possible.
• Incentive compatibility (IC)5
– Dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC): It is a dominant strategy for every
agent to report her true valuation sincerely. I.e., for every agent i and for every vector
5Technically, as can be inferred, the DSIC properties are reserved for direct revelation mechansims, i.e., where the buyer
solely interacts with the mechanism reporting her valuation function. It is well-known that mechanisms admiing a
dominant strategy can be transformed into DSIC direct revelation mechanisms, and those with a Bayes-Nash equilibrium
can be transformed into BIC direct revelation mechanisms. is way, the DSIC and BIC denitions naturally extend to
non-direct revelation mechanisms.
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of valuations of all other players, it is impossible for agent i to increase her expected
utility by misreporting her valuation.
– Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC): It is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) for the
agents to truthfully report their valuations to the mechanism. I.e., each agent i max-
imizes her expected utility by truthfully reporting her valuation if all other players
also truthfully report their valuations.
• Individual rationality (IR)
– Ex-post individual rationality (ex-post IR): It is not harmful for any agent to participate
in the mechanism, i.e., there is guaranteed to be a strategy for an agent that yields the
agent a utility that is not less than her initial utility. (e initial utility of a seller with
bundle Ij isw j (Ij ), and the initial utility of a buyer is vi (∅) = 0.)
– Interim individual rationality (interim IR): ere is a strategy for each agent that yields
her an expected increase that is not less than her initial utility (where expectation is
over the random outcome of the mechanism, resulting from internal randomness of
the mechanism and randomized strategies adopted by the agents).
• Budget balance (BB)
– Strong Budget Balance (SBB):e sum of all agents’ payments output by the mechanism
is equal to zero. Conceptually, this means that no money ends up at an external party,
and no external party needs to subsidise the mechanism.
– Weak Budget Balance (WBB): e sum of all payments is at least zero. In two sided-
markets, this generally means that the buyers’ payments are at least as large as the
payments received by the sellers. No external party needs to subsidise the mechanism.
For valuation proles (v,w ), OPT(v,w ) := max{SW(X ,Y ) : (X ,Y ) ∈ A} denotes the optimal
social welfare. e expected optimal social welfare is the value OPT = Ev,w [OPT(v,w )]. We say
that a mechanism M α-approximates the optimal social welfare for some α > 1 if and only if
OPT ≤ αEv,w [SW(M(v,w ))]. Our goal is to nd mechanisms that α-approximate the optimal
social welfare for a low α , are DSIC (or BIC), SBB, and ex-post IR (or interim IR).
2.3 Valuation Functions
We will consider probability distributions over the following classes of valuation functions. Let
v : 2[k] → R≥0 be a valuation function. en,
• v is additive if and only if there exist numbers α1, . . . αk ∈ R≥0 such that v (S ) = ∑j ∈S α j
for all S ⊆ [k].
• v is fractionally subadditive (or XOS) if and only if there exists a collection of additive
functions a1, . . . ,ad such that for every bundle S ⊆ [k] it holds that v (S ) = maxi ∈[d] ai (S ).
• v is subadditive if and only if for for all S ,T ⊆ [k] it holds that v (S ∪T ) ≤ v (S ) +v (T ).
It is easy to see that every additive function is a XOS function. Further, it is well-known that the
class of submodular functions are contained in the class of XOS functions, and XOS functions are
contained in the class of the subadditive functions.
3 AN INITIAL MECHANISM AND DIRECT TRADE STRONG BUDGET BALANCE
Blumrosen and Dobzinski [2014] present a mechanism for exchange markets with subadditive
valuation functions. ey prove the following for this mechanism, which we nameMbd.
Theorem 3.1 (Blumrosen and Dobzinski [2014]). Mechanism Mbd is a DSIC, WBB, ex-post
IR randomized direct revelation mechanism that 4H (s )-approximates the optimal social welfare for
combinatorial exchangemarkets (n,k,I ,F ) with subadditive valuation functions, where s = min{n, |Ii | :
R. Colini-Baldeschi, P.W. Goldberg, B. de Keijzer, S. Leonardi, T. Roughgarden, and S. Turchea 9
i ∈ [n]} is the minimum of the number of agents and the number of items in an agent’s initial
endowment, and H (·) denotes the harmonic numbers.
In particular, this mechanism gives us a constant approximation factor if the number of starting
items of the agents is bounded by a constant.
Now consider a mechanismMsbb that selects an agent i ∈ [n] uniformly at random, runsMbd on
the remaining agents, and allocates the surplus money ofMbd to agent i . We are then able to prove
the following.
Theorem 3.2. MechanismMsbb is DSIC, ex-post IR, SBB, and achieves an 8nH (s )/(n−1)-approximation
to the optimal social welfare for exchange markets with subadditive valuations and at least 3 agents.6
e proof and a more precise description of Msbb are provided in Appendix A. is yields an
ex-post IR, SBB, DSIC mechanism thatO (1)-approximates the social welfare if the number of items
initially posessed by an agent is bounded by a constant. e principle that we used to construct
MechanismMsbb can more generally be used to turn any WBB mechanism into an SBB one, while
preserving the DSIC and ex-post IR properties. It also reveals a problematic aspect of the notion of
SBB: it allows for agents to receive money, while they are not involved in any trade. is motivates
a strengthened notion of strong budget balance, which we call direct trade strong budget balance.
Denition 3.3. A mechanism for an exchange market satises direct trade strong budget balance
(DSBB) if and only if the outcome it generates can be achieved by a set of bilateral trades, where
each trade consists of a reallocation of an item from an agent i to an agent j, and a monetary
transfer from agent j to agent i . Moreover, each item may only be traded once.
DSBB strengthens the traditional SBB notion and seems to be a reasonable requirement in most
two sided markets and exchange markets seings. Note that the way in which we strengthen SBB
is rather mild: DSBB still allows an arbitrarily large amount of money to be transfered from one
agent to another as long as at least one item is exchanged in the opposite direction. DSBB does not
even require such a bilateral exchange to be protable for both parties, but does nonetheless seem
to rule out the rather unsatisfactory type construction such as the one used inMsbb.
It can be seen that MechanismMsbb does not satisfy DSBB. In the remainder of the paper we
will proceed to design mechanisms for two-sided markets that do satisfy DSBB.7 Moreover, two
of our results provide an O (1)-approximation even in seings whereMsbb would only provide an
approximation factor of logarithmic order.
4 A MECHANISM FOR UNIT-SUPPLY SELLERS AND XOS BUYERS
In this section we present a DSIC, ex-post IR, and DSBB mechanism for two-sided markets, when
sellers initially possess a single item and buyers have XOS valuation functions. is mechanism
achieves a constant approximation to the optimal social welfare. In this seing, we use [k] to
denote both the set of items and the set of sellers, where item j is owned by seller j (so Ij = {j}
for all j ∈ [k]). For each seller j ∈ [k], we then treat Fj as a distribution over R≥0 instead of a
distribution over functions.
We assume throughout this section that (n,k,k,I ,G,F ) is a given two-sided market, on which
we run the mechanism to be dened. For an allocation (X ,Y ) ∈ A, we shall use the notation
6For two agents, it is straightforward to come up with alternative mechanisms that have the desired properties.
7We note that the double auctions given in [Colini-Baldeschi et al., 2016] also satisfy the DSBB property.
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SWB ,SWS to respectively denote the buyers’ and the sellers’ contribution to the social welfare, i.e.,
SWB (X ,Y ) :=
n∑
i=1
vi (Xi ),
SWS (X ,Y ) :=
k∑
i=1
w j (Yj ) =
k∑
j=1
w j I[j ∈ Yj ].
(1)
Our mechanism requires xing a price for every item in the market. For a bundle of available
items Λ and an item price vector p = (p1, . . . ,pk ) ∈ Rk≥0, we dene the demand correspondence of
buyer i ∈ [n] with valuation function vi as
D (vi ,p,Λ) :=
S ⊆ Λ : vi (S ) −
∑
j ∈S
pj ≥ vi (T ) −
∑
j ∈T
pj for all T ⊆ Λ
 ,
i.e., D (vi ,p,Λ) is the set of bundles of items in Λ that maximise i’s utility under the given item
prices.
For a buyer i with valuation function vi , we dene the additive representative function for
bundle T ⊆ [k] as any additive function a(vi ,T , ·) : 2[k] → R≥0 such that vi (T ) = a(vi ,T ,T ), and
vi (S ) ≥ a(vi ,T ,S ) for all S ⊆ [k]. e additive representative function of a bundle is guaranteed to
exist for each buyer i and for each valuation function in the support ofGi , by the denition of XOS
functions.
4.1 Mechanism
Let A be an algorithm that, given a buyers’ valuation prole v and a set of items [k], allocates
the items to the buyers, without considering the sellers and their valuations. A can either be an
exact algorithm that outputs an optimal allocation of [k] to the buyers (if one is not interested in
the runtime) or an approximately optimal one (in the case that one insists on polynomial-time
implementability). Our mechanism uses A as a black-box for the computation of item prices.
Let X all (v ) = (X all1 (v ), . . . ,X alln (v )) be the output allocation of A(v ). Let SW(X all (v )) be the
total social welfare of the allocation X all (v ).
We dene for each item j ∈ [k] its contribution SWBj (v ) to the social welfare SW(X all (v )) as follows:
if there exists a buyer i that receives item j in allocation X alli (v ), then SWBj (v ) = a(vi ,X alli (v ), {j}).
Otherwise, if j is not allocated to any buyer in X alli (v ), then SWBj (v ) = 0.
is notion allows us to make a distinction between high welfare items and low welfare items. An
item j ∈ [k] is said to have high welfare with respect to SW(X alli (v )) if and only if Ev [SWBj (v )] ≥
4E[w j ], i.e., the expected social welfare contribution of j if we would allocate j according to X all (v )
is at least four times as high as the social welfare that results from leaving item j with its seller.
Formally, let H be the set of high welfare items, i.e., H := {` ∈ [k] : E[SWB` (v )] ≥ 4E[w j ]},
and let L be the set of low welfare items, i.e. L := [k] \ H . For each high welfare item j ∈ H , the
mechanism makes use of the following associated item price pj :
pj :=
1
2Ev [SW
B
j (v )].
Observe that pj ≥ 2E[w j ] for all j ∈ H , by our denition of high welfare items.
e reason why H is chosen in such a way is twofold: rst, the items in L if kept by their sellers
provide a welfare loss of at most a constant factor; second, every item in H is guaranteed to be sold
(if sold) at a high price, to make sure that the buyer receiving the item has a high valuation for it.
R. Colini-Baldeschi, P.W. Goldberg, B. de Keijzer, S. Leonardi, T. Roughgarden, and S. Turchea 11
Our (randomized) mechanism does the following. First, it considers the sellers with an item in
H (in any order) and asks each of them whether they would sell their item for a price of pj . As
mentioned above, by denition of the prices, every seller j ∈ H accepts the price with probability
at least 1/2, by Markov’s inequality (recall that pj ≥ 2E[w j ] for all j ∈ H ).
To make sure that this probability is exactly 1/2, the seller j is only given the opportunity to
sell her item at the price pj with probability qj such that (in expectation) the oer is accepted with
probability exactly 1/2. Formally this means that the mechanism makes an oer to the seller j with
probability
qj :=
1
2Fj (pj )
, where Fj (pj ) = Pr[w j ≤ pj ].
An item inH is considered to be “in the market” if the corresponding seller accepts the mechanism’s
oer. Aer the mechanism has made the oers to the sellers of H , it knows which items are in the
market and then asks each buyer (sequentially, in any order) for her favorite bundle of items among
those items that are still in the market. If an item j gets requested by a buyer, then j is transferred
from its corresponding seller j, and the buyer pays pj to seller j. Item j is then removed from the
set of items in the market, and the mechanism proceeds to the next buyer.
We call the mechanism sketched aboveM1-supply, which we now present more precisely:
(1) Let H := {j ∈ [k] : Ev [SWBj (v )] ≥ 4E[w j ]}.
(2) For all j ∈ H , set pj := 12Ev [SWBj (v )].
(3) Let Λ1 := ∅,Xi := ∅ for all i ∈ [n] and Yj := {j} for all j ∈ [k].
(4) For all j ∈ H :
(a) Set qj := 1/(2Pr[w j ≤ pj ]).
(b) With probability qj , oer payment pj in exchange for her item.
(c) If j accepts the oer, set Λ1 := Λ1 ∪ {j}.
(5) For all i ∈ [n]:
(a) Buyer i chooses a bundle Bi ∈ D (vi ,p,Λi ) that maximises her utility.
(b) Allocate the accepted items to buyer i , i.e., Xi := Bi and Yj := ∅ for all j ∈ Bi .
(c) Remove the selected items from the available items, i.e., Λi+1 := Λi \ Bi .
(6) Return the outcome consisting of allocation (X = (X1, . . . ,Xn ),Y = (Y1, . . . ,Yk )) and payments
ρ = (ρB ,ρS ), where ρBi =
∑
j ∈Xi pj for i ∈ [n] and ρSj = −pj I[Yj = ∅] for j ∈ [k].
Note that Algorithm A is only used in the rst steps of mechanismM1-supply, where Ev [SWBj (v )]
is computed. Let α be the factor by which A is guaranteed to approximate the social welfare of the
buyers.
4.2 Results
Now, we are ready to present the main result of this section:
Theorem 4.1. M1-supply is ex-post IR, DSIC, DSBB, and (2 + 4α )-approximates the optimal social
welfare.
In particular, taking for A an optimal algorithm (i.e., α = 1), we obtain that there exists a
mechanism that is ex-post IR, DSIC, DSBB, and 6-approximates the optimal social welfare. As
mentioned in Section 1.3, one may alternatively take for A a polynomial time α-approximation
algorithm and use the technique of [Feldman et al., 2015], to obtain a mechanism with runtime
POLY (1/ϵ ,n,m) that approximates the optimal social welfare within a 2 + 4α multiplicative factor
and an ϵ additive term.
We split the proof of eorem 4.1 into two lemmas that separately bound the sellers’ and the buy-
ers’ relative contributions to the social welfare. We use the notation OPT as dened in Section 2, and
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we use ALG to denote the expected social welfare of the mechanism, i.e., Ev,w [SW(M1-supply (v,w ))].
Moreover, the superscripts S ,B respectively denote the sellers’ and buyers’ contributions to the
social welfare, e.g., OPT = OPTS + OPTB and ALG = ALGS + ALGB , consistent with the notation
of (1).
e following lemma is a simple consequence of the fact that M1-supply lets every seller in H
accept an oer with probability exactly 1/2.
Lemma 4.2. If every seller j ∈ H puts her item into the market with probability exactly 1/2, then
2ALGS ≥
k∑
j=1
E[w j ] ≥ OPTS .
Proof. e second inequality is trivial, so we focus on the rst inequality. First, observe that
Pr[w j > pj ] ≤ Pr[w j > 2E[w j ]] < 12 ,
where the rst inequality holds because j ∈ L, and the second inequality follows by Markov’s
inequality. us, with probability at least 1/2 a seller j is happy to sell her item at price pj . But every
seller receives an oer from the mechanism with probability qj := 1/(2Pr[w j ≤ pj ]), so every seller
in H accepts to trade with probability exactly 1/2. is implies that every seller j ∈ H contributes
in expectation at least E[w j ]/2 to the social welfare. Moreover, every seller in L never trades, so
that such a seller contributes her full expected valuation to the expected social welfare. 
Next, we provide a more dicult bound that relates ALGB and ALGS to OPTB . e proof of this
lemma is lengthy and therefore deferred to Appendix B.1.
Lemma 4.3. e buyers’ contributions to the optimal social welfare is bounded by
4αALGB + 4αALGS ≥ OPTB .
Intuitively, Lemma 4.3 uses two main ingredients:
• the partition of the items between high-welfare (H ) items and low-welfare items (L), and
• the denition of SWBj (v ) w.r.t. a one-sided (approximation) algorithm A.
e laer tells us that the sum of the expected contributions of all the items, i.e. ∑kj=1 E[SWB` (v )],
is an upper-bound on OPTB/α . From the former we know that:
• the sellers do not trade items in L, and this is enough to ensure that their contribution to
the expected social welfare is greater than a constant fraction of the expected contribution
of the items in L, i.e. ALGS > 14
∑
j ∈L E[SWBj (v )]. Moreover,
• the only items that the agents can trade are those that have a high welfare w.r.t. SW(X alli (v )).
From that we can (not trivially, see Appendix B.1) infer that the contribution of the buyers to
the expected social welfare is greater than a constant fraction of the expected contribution
of the items in H , i.e. ALGB > 14
∑
j ∈H E[SWBj (v )].
By combining these bounds, the claim of Lemma 4.3 follows. eorem 4.1 is then obtained
straightforwardly from Lemma 4.2 and Lemma 4.3.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. e bound on the approximation ratio follows from the sum of the
inequalities of Lemma 4.2 and Lemma 4.3. Moreover, it is a dominant strategy for a seller to accept
if and only if the payment oered to her exceeds her valuation, and it is a dominant strategy for
a buyer to choose a utility-maximising bundle for the items and item prices oered to her. us,
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when viewed as a direct revelation mechanism,M1-supply is DSIC. It is clear that participating in
the mechanism can never lead to a decrease in utility for both buyers and sellers, and therefore the
mechanism is also ex-post IR. Lastly, it is straightforward to see that the mechanism is DSBB, as
the denition ofM1-supply which we gave in terms of sequential posted pricing naturally yields us
the required set of bilateral trades. 
5 A MECHANISM FOR ADDITIVE SELLERS AND XOS BUYERS
We now consider the seing in which sellers may own multiple distinct items and have an additive
valuation function over them. We design a DSBB mechanism that is DSIC and ex-post IR on the
sellers’ side, and BIC and interim IR on the buyers’ side. At the end of the section we show that, in
the case that both buyers and sellers have additive valuation functions, the mechanism we present
is DSIC and ex-post IR on both sides of the market.
We assume throughout this section that (n,m,k,I ,G,F ) is a given two-sided market with XOS
buyers and additive sellers, on which we run the mechanism to be dened. Like in the previous
section, the buyers are still assumed to have XOS valuation functions over the items. Since now
the number of items and sellers is dierent in general, we usem to denote the number of sellers
and k for the number of items. e valuation w j of a seller j is now an additive function. We
reuse the following notation from Section 4: the allocation (X all1 (v ), . . . ,X alln (v )) returned by an
allocation algorithm A on input v returns an allocation of [k] to [n]. We let α ≥ 1 again denote
the approximation factor by which A approximates the social welfare. For XOS valuation vi and
bundle T ⊆ [k] we use a(vi ,T , ·) to denote the additive representative function of vi for T . Also we
use the buyers’ social welfare contribution SWB` (v ) for item ` ∈ [k] and buyers’ valuation prole
v , as dened in Section 4.
Furthermore, we dene the sellers’ social welfare contribution SWS
`
(w ) for item ` ∈ Ij and sellers’
valuation prole w as SWS
`
(w ) := w j ({`}). Due to the fact that for j ∈ [m], w j is an additive
function, there is no need for dening the notion of an additive representative function for a seller.
5.1 Mechanism
We aim to design a BIC, interim IR, and DSBB mechanism that approximates the optimal social
welfare within a constant. We propose the following mechanism, which we refer to asMadd. We let
Hj := {` ∈ Ij : E[SWB` (v )] ≥ 4E[SWS` (w )]} and Lj := Ij \Hj for all j ∈ [m], and we letH :=
⋃m
j=1Hj
and L := [k] \ H denote the sets of high-welfare items and low-welfare items, respectively. Our
mechanism will only allow trading items in H . We dene for ` ∈ H the item price
p` :=
1
2E[SW
B
` (v )],
similar to what we did forM1-supply.
An essential dierence betweenMadd andM1-supply is that the order in which buyers and sellers
are processed is reversed. Mechanism Madd roughly works as follows. It rst asks every buyer
which set of items it would like to receive from those items in H that have not been requested yet.
enMadd oers every seller j ∈ [m] a payment in exchange for the subset of all items in Ij that
have been requested. is oer is made with probability qj , chosen in such a way that the requested
items of seller j are transferred to the buyers with probability 1/2. e items of the sellers accepting
the oer are transferred to the buyers for the corresponding item prices. Buyers act strategically,
and will request a bundle of items that maximises their expected utility, knowing that the item sets
requested from each seller will be assigned to them with probability 1/2.8 In our mechanism, the
8Buyers may need to make complex calculations in order to establish which bundle maximises her expected utility.
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sellers will each have a dominant strategy, while the buyers’ aformentioned behaviour relies on
the sellers playing their dominant strategies. is reliance results in a BIC (rather than a DSIC)
mechanism. Below we describe the mechanism in more detail and we subsequently provide an
example of the mechanism’s execution on a simple instance.
(1) For ` ∈ [k], compute E[SWB
`
(v )] and E[SWS
`
(w )].
(2) For all j ∈ [m], compute Hj .
(3) Compute H and L.
(4) Let Λ1 := H , Xi := ∅ for all i ∈ [n], and Yj := Ij for all j ∈ [m].
(5) For each buyer i ∈ [n]:
(a) Ask buyer i to select an expected-utility maximising bundle Bi ⊆ Λi given the prices {p` : ` ∈
Λi } from the set of available items Λi (where the expectation is taken w.r.t. the randomness
of the valuations and the mechanism).
(b) Update the set of available items Λi+1 := Λi \ Bi .
(6) Let B := ⋃ni=1 Bi be the set of all items demanded by the buyers.
(7) For each seller j ∈ [m]:
(a) Let Sj := B ∩ Hj be the set of items owned by seller j that are demanded.
(b) Let p (Sj ) :=
∑
`∈Sj p` and let qj = 1/(2Pr[w j (Sj ) ≤ p (Sj )]).
(c) With probability qj , oer payment p (Sj ) in exchange for the bundle Sj . Otherwise, skip this
seller.
(d) If the seller accepts the oer, allocate each items in Sj to the buyer that requested it (i.e.,
remove Sj from Yj and add Sj ∩ Bi to Xi for all i ∈ [n])
(8) Return the outcome consisting of allocation (X = (X1, . . . ,Xn ),Y = (Y1, . . . ,Yk )) and payments
ρ = (ρB ,ρS ), where ρBi =
∑
`∈Xi p` for i ∈ [n] and ρSj =
∑
`∈Ij \Yj −p` for j ∈ [m].
Notice the mechanismMadd runs in polynomial time, but it makes use of a variant of a standard
demand query in which the mechanism gives prices for the items, and asks a buyer which bundle
she would like if, for each item in that bundle, she were to receive it with probability 1/2. is places
a heavier computational and cognitive burden on the agent than with standard demand queries.
We will not address in the present paper the complexity aspects of the buyer’s task to answer such
queries, though we believe that it is an interesting open question to investigate.
e following example illustrates some important aspects of Madd, and the strategies of the
buyers under a BNE.
Example 5.1. ere is one buyer and two unit-supply sellers. Each seller has one item. e
buyer has two XOS valuation functions v1 and v2, each chosen with probability 1/2. Valuation v1
is composed of 3 additive functions a1, a2, and a3, i.e., v1 (S ) = max{a1 (S ),a2 (S ),a3 (S )}. Valuation
v2 consists of a single additive function a4. Each seller j has a valuation function w j = 0. Recall
that a function a is additive if there exists α1, . . . ,αk such that a(S ) =
∑
j ∈S α j for all S ⊆ [k]. e
functions a1 to a4 are described in the table below by listing the values α1 and α2.
Function item 1 (α1) item 2 (α2)
a1 0 4
a2 8 0
a3 7 2
a4 1 6
Let us compute the prices oered by the mechanismMadd when A is an optimal algorithm. us,
we need to compute the expected contribution to the optimal social welfare of every item. First,
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notice that the optimum allocates the items 1 and 2 to the buyer when her valuation is v1. In this
case the contribution to the optimal social welfare of item 1 is 7, and the contribution of item 2
is 2. Similarly, if the buyer has valuation v2, the optimum still allocates items 1 and 2 to her, but
in this case the contribution to the optimal social welfare of item 1 is 1, and the contribution of
item 2 is 6. us, the expected contribution of every item to the optimal social welfare is 4, i.e.,
E[SWBj (v )] = 4 for all j = 1,2. Since the price pj of each item is dened to be half of the expected
contribution to the optimal social welfare, pj = 2 for all the items.
When the mechanism makes asks a buyer to select a bundle that maximizes her expected utility,
the buyer has to answer by taking into account the fact that each item in her requested bundle will
be allocated with probability 1/2. First, consider the case when the buyer has valuation v1. In this
case the expected utility for the dierent bundles are:
u ({1}) = 12 · (8 − 4) +
1
2 · 0 = 2,
u ({2}) = 12 · (4 − 4) +
1
2 · 0 = 0,
u ({1,2}) = 14 · (8 − 4) +
1
4 · (4 − 4) +
1
4 · (9 − 8) +
1
4 · 0 =
5
4 .
e utility-maximising bundle that will be requested by the buyer in case of v1 is {1}. Instead, if
the valuation of the buyer is v2, then the requested bundle will be {1,2}.
5.2 Results
Our main result forMadd is the following theorem.
Theorem 5.2. emechanismMadd is interim IR, BIC, DSBB, and (2+4α )-approximates the optimal
social welfare.
By taking for A an optimal algorithm (i.e., α = 1), we obtain a mechanism that is ex-post IR,
DSIC, SBB, and 6-approximates the optimal social welfare. Again, we split the proof of this theorem
5.2 into two lemmas that separately bound the sellers’ and the buyers’ relative contributions to
the social welfare. Like the previous section, we use the notation OPT as dened in Section 2, and
we use ALG to denote the expected social welfare of the mechanism. Moreover, we use again the
superscripts B and S to refer to the buyers’ and sellers’ expected contribution to the social welfare
of a given allocation, as we did in Section 4.
Let us rst discuss how we bound the sellers’ expected contribution to the optimal allocation.
Lemma 5.3.
2ALGS ≥ OPTS .
Proof. e only items that our mechanisms potentially reallocates are the ones belonging to H .
Every item in L stays with its seller. For the items in H , the mechanism ensures every seller sells
her demanded bundle with probability exactly 1/2, so for each seller it holds that she retains her
full initial endowment with probability at least 1/2, which implies the claim. 
Similarly, we want to provide an upper bound on the buyers’ expected contribution to the optimal
allocation. To do that we need two auxiliary propositions.
e rst proposition exploits the partition of the items among high-welfare items and low-welfare
items. Since the low-welfare items are not traded, the sum of the expected contribution of the
buyers on the high-welfare items and the expected contribution of the sellers on the low-welfare
items gives us an upper bound on the buyers’ expected contribution in the allocation computed by
A.
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Proposition 5.4.∑
`∈H
Ev [SWB` (v )] + 4
∑
`∈L
Ew [SWS` (w )] >
n∑
i=1
Ev [vi (X alli (v ))].
Proof. Let a(vi ,X alli (v ), ·) be the representative additive function of vi for the bundle X alli (v ).
en,
n∑
i=1
E[vi (X alli (v ))] =
n∑
i=1
E

∑
`∈X alli (v )
a(vi ,X
all
i (v ), {`})

=
n∑
i=1
k∑
`=1
E[a(vi ,X alli (v ), {`})I[` ∈ X alli (v )]]
=
k∑
`=1
E[SWB` (v )]
=
∑
`∈H
E[SWB` (v )] +
∑
`∈L
E[SWB` (v )]
<
∑
`∈H
E[SWB` (v )] + 4
∑
`∈L
E[SWS` (w )].
e last inequality follows because by denition of L,
4
∑
`∈L
E[SWS` (w )] >
∑
`∈L
E[SWB` (v )].

Now, since buyers can obtain only high-welfare items, their contribution to the expected social
welfare ofMadd is greater than a constant fraction of the expected contribution of the high-welfare
items to the allocation computed by A. e proof of Proposition 5.5 is deferred to Appendix B.2.
Proposition 5.5.
ALGB ≥ 14
∑
`∈H
Ev [SWB` (v )].
us, using Proposition 5.4 and Proposition 5.5 we can prove that the sum of the buyers’ expected
contribution and the sellers’ expected contribution ofMadd provides a constant approximation to
the buyers’ expected contribution in the optimal allocation.
Lemma 5.6.
4αALGB + 4αALGS > OPTB .
Proof. By Proposition 5.5, 4ALGB ≥ ∑`∈H Ev [SWB` (v )]. Moreover, our mechanism leaves
every item ` ∈ L with its seller, and so ALGS ≥ ∑`∈L Ew [SWS` (w )]. erefore,
4ALGB + 4ALGS ≥
∑
`∈H
Ev [SWB` (v )] + 4
∑
`∈L
Ew [SWS` (w )] >
n∑
i=1
Ev [vi (X alli (v ))] ≥
1
α
OPTB .
e second inequality holds by Proposition 5.4, and the last inequality follows because we dened α
to be the approximation factor of algorithm A, which is the algorithm that we assumed to generate
allocation X all (v ). 
Finally, we are ready to prove the main theorem of this section.
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Proof of Theorem 5.2. On the sellers’ side, the mechanism is ex-post IR and DSIC: the sellers
solely have to decide between accepting or rejecting a single oer to receive a proposed payment
in exchange for a bundle of items, and it is clearly a dominant strategy to accept if and only if
such an exchange leads to an improvement in the seller’s utility. Every buyer chooses a bundle
that maximises her expected utility, and this choice depends solely on the choice of strategies of
the sellers. erefore, the mechanism has a BNE in which the sellers play a dominant strategy,
and the mechanism is thus ex-interim IR and BIC. e fact that the mechanism is DSBB follows
from its denition, which makes clear that payments are dened by the appropriate sequence of
trades and payments from buyers to sellers. e approximation guarantee follows by the sum of
the inequalities of the above Lemmas 5.3 and 5.6. 
It is important to notice that the mechanismMadd turns into a DSIC and ex-post IR mechanism
if the buyers have additive valuations instead of XOS valuations.
Corollary 5.7. For the special case that for all i ∈ [n], distributionGi is over additive valuation
functions,Madd is ex-post IR, DSIC, DSBB and (2 + 4α )-approximates the optimal social welfare.
Proof. If a buyer i ∈ [n] has an additive valuation function, it is a dominant strategy to request
the items in Λi (v<i )) for which it holds that vi ({`}) > p` . is follows from the simple fact that by
additivity, the utility that a buyer has for any bundle of items S can be wrien as ∑`∈S vi ({`}) − p` .
us, for every item ` ∈ [k] that a buyer requests (recall that this item is then allocated to her for
price p` with probability 1/2), a term of (1/2) (vi ({`}) − p` ) gets added to her expected utility. So
including ` in her requested bundle is protable if and only if vi ({`}) − p` ≥ 0. Using the same
argument, the ex-post IR property is also satised by following this strategy. 
6 DISCUSSION
An open problem is to extend or rene our mechanisms so that they satisfy the DSIC and ex-post
IR properties for the case of XOS buyers and additive sellers. e rst naive approach for doing so
might be trying to consider every additive seller as a set of distinct unit-supply sellers and then run
M1-supply. However, this is not guaranteed to work due to the fact that an additive valuation function
may have intrinsic interdependencies among the items (e.g. if there are duplicates among the items)
and so the independence of these distinct unit-supply sellers is not guaranteed. Something we might
additionally consider to do is to ask every seller for her favorite bundle to place in the market, yet
this may cause a seller to regret having chosen that particular bundle aer seeing the realizations
of the buyers’ valuations. On the other hand, it also seems highly challenging to establish any sort
of impossibility result for any reasonably dened class of posted price mechanisms for two-sided
markets.
Another natural direction is to extend the above mechanism to the seing in which both buyers
and sellers possess an XOS valuation function over bundles of items. A rst challenge consists
in nding a suitable denition of the sellers’ social welfare contribution of an item using the
corresponding representative additive function.
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A AN INITIAL MECHANISM AND DIRECT TRADE STRONG BUDGET BALANCE
(FULL DETAILS)
Blumrosen and Dobzinski [2014] present a mechanism for exchange markets with subadditive
valuation functions. ey prove the following for this mechanism, which we nameMbd.
Theorem A.1 (Blumrosen and Dobzinski [2014]). Mechanism Mbd is a DSIC, WBB, ex-post
IR randomized direct revelation mechanism that 4H (s )-approximates the optimal social welfare for
combinatorial exchangemarkets (n,k,I ,F ) with subadditive valuation functions, where s = min{n, |Ii | :
i ∈ [n]} is theminimum of the number of agents and the number of items in an agents initial endowment,
and H (·) denotes the harmonic numbers.
In particular, this mechanism gives us a constant approximation factor if the number of starting
items of the agents is bounded by a constant.
We show now howwe can use this mechanism as a black box in order to obtain an SBBmechanism
with only a slightly worse approximation ratio. Dene mechanismMsbb as follows. When given as
input a combinatorial exchange market C = (n,k,I ,F ),
(1) Select an agent in i ∈ [n] uniformly at random.
(2) Run MechanismMbd on the combinatorial exchange market
C−i = ([n] \ {i},I−i = (I1, . . . , Ii−1, Ii+1, . . . , In ),F−i = (F1, . . . ,Fi−1,Fi+1, . . . ,Fn )).
Let (X−i ,ρ−i ) be the outcome that MechanismMbd outputs.
(3) Set Xi = Ii and set pi = −∑j ∈[n]\{i } pj . Output the allocation (Xi ,X−i ) and output payment
vector (pi ,ρ−i ).
So MechanismMsbb essentially runs MechanismMbd where one random agent is removed from
the market. is agent receives the leover money that MechanismMbd generates, and does not
receive or lose any items. e following is a direct corollary of the DSIC, WBB, and ex-post IR
properties of mechanismMbd.
Theorem A.2. MechanismMsbb is a DSIC, SBB, and ex-post IR mechanism for exchange markets
with subadditive valuation functions.
Secondly, the following theorem shows that the mechanism loses only a factor 2n/(n − 1) ≤ 3
in the approximation ratio for n ≥ 3. (For n = 2 it is straightforward to come up with alternative
mechanisms that achieve a good approximation ratio.)
Theorem A.3. MechanismMsbb achieves an 8nH (s )/(n − 1)-approximation to the optimal social
welfare for exchange markets with subadditive valuations and at least 3 agents.
Proof. Fix a valuation vector v of the agents, let X ∗∗v ⊆ A be the social welfare maximising
allocation when the agents have valuationsv . For an agent i ∈ [n], denote by X ∗∗
v,−i the allocation
for C−i where (X ∗∗v,−i )j = (X ∗∗v )j \ Ii for j ∈ [n] \ {i}, i.e., the allocation obtained from X ∗∗v when
i is removed, and all items of i are removed. Moreover let X ∗
v,−i be the optimal allocation of the
combinatorial exchange market C−i when the valuation function vector of the players [n] \ {i}
is xed tov−i . MechanismMsbb selects i uniformly at random, so by eorem A.1, the expected
social welfare of MechanismMsbb is at least
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1
4H (s )Ei

∑
j ∈[n]\{i }
vj (X
∗
v,−i )
 ≥
1
4H (s )Ei

∑
j ∈[n]\{i }
vj (X
∗∗
v,−i )

=
1
4nH (s )
∑
i ∈[n]
∑
j ∈[n]\{i }
vj ((X
∗∗
v )j \ Ii )
=
1
4nH (s )
∑
i ∈[n]
∑
j ∈[n]\{i }
vi ((X
∗∗
v )i \ Ij )
=
1
4nH (s )
∑
i ∈[n]
∑
{j,j′ }:j,j′∈[n]\{i }
∧j,j′
1
n − 2 (vi ((X
∗∗
v )i \ Ij ) +vi ((X ∗∗v )i \ Ij′ ))
≥ 14nH (s )
∑
i ∈[n]
∑
{j,j′ }:j,j′∈[n]\{i }∧j,j′
1
n − 2vi (X
∗∗
v )
=
1
4nH (s )
∑
i ∈[n]
n − 1
2 vi (X
∗∗
v )
=
n − 1
8nH (s )
∑
i ∈[n]
vi (X
∗∗
v ),
where the second inequality follows from subadditivity. is proves the claim, since the above
holds for every valuation vectorv . 
is yields an ex-post IR, SBB, DSIC mechanism that O (1)-approximates the social welfare if the
number of items initially posessed by an agent is bounded by a constant.
e principle that we used to construct Mechanism Msbb can more generally be used to turn
any WBB mechanism into an SBB one, while preserving the DSIC and ex-post IR properties. is
principle also reveals a problematic aspect of the notion of SBB: it allows for agents to receive
money, while they are not involved in any trade. is motivates a strengthened notion of strong
budget balance, which we call direct trade strong budget balance.
Denition A.4. A mechanism for an exchange market satises direct trade strong budget balance
(DSBB) if and only if the outcome it generates can be achieved by a set of bilateral trades, where
each trade consists of a reallocation of an item from an agent i to an agent j, and a monetary
transfer from agent j to agent i . Moreover, each item may only be traded once.
It can be seen that MechanismMsbb does not satisfy DSBB. In the remainder of the paper we
will proceed to design mechanisms for two-sided markets that do satisfy DSBB.9
B PROOFS
B.1 Proof of Lemma 4.3
In order to do prove Lemma 4.3, we rst prove two propositions: one of them bounds the expected
sum of the buyers’ utilities, and one of them bounds the expected sum of the buyers’ payments. In
both propositions we only consider items in H .
Given a buyers’ valuation prolev , letv<i = (v1, . . . ,vi−1). Further, let Z be a random variable
that denotes the sellers that receive and accept an oer from the mechanism, i.e., the set Λ1 at
step 5 of M1-supply. For i ∈ [n] let Λi (v<i ,Z ) be the set Λi as given in the denition of M1-supply
9We note that the double auctions given in [Colini-Baldeschi et al., 2016] also satisfy the DSBB property.
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when the valuation prole of the buyers is v and Z are the sellers in the market. Note that this
implies that Xi ⊆ Λi (v<i ,Z ) ⊆ Z . Consequently, Λn+1 (v,Z ) is the subset of items for which the
corresponding sellers have accepted the oer made to them by the mechanism, but remain allocated
to the corresponding seller aer execution.
Proposition B.1. e total expected utility of the buyers for the allocation returned byM1-supply is
bounded from below by
E

∑
i ∈[n]
ui (M1-supply (v,w ))
 ≥
1
2
∑
j ∈H
Prv,Z [j ∈ Λn+1 (v,Z ) | j ∈ Z ]pj .
(Note that the random variables in this expression are v,w , and the decisions of the mechanism to
make oers to the sellers in H .)
Proof. First, note that for each j ∈ H it holds that Pr[j ∈ Z ] = 1/2. Recall that we dened
pj := (1/2)Ev [SWBj (v )]. us, observe that by denition of pj , SWBj (v ), and the law of total
probability, it holds for all j ∈ H that
pj = Ev [SWBj (v ) − pj ] =
n∑
i=1
Ev [(SWBj (v ) − pj )I[j ∈ X alli (v )]]. (2)
Fix i ∈ [n], buyers’ valuation prolev , and set Z ⊆ H of sellers who accepted the mechanism’s
oer, and now consider the set Λi (v<i ,Z ) ⊆ H of available items that i can choose from. Notice that
these do not depend on vi since the buyers in {1, . . . ,i − 1} select their favorite bundle regardless of
vi . Moreover, notice that since the sellers are processed before the buyers, Λ1 (v<1,z) only contains
items whose sellers are willing to trade at the posted prices. Buyer i selects a bundle that maximises
her utility, i.e., that is in D (vi ,p,Λi (v<i ,Z )).
Now consider an additional randomly drawn prole of valuation functions v˜−i for all buyers
except i , that is independent ofv . LetX alli (vi ,v˜−i ) be the allocation of buyer i returned byA(vi ,v˜−i ).
For i ∈ [n], consider the corresponding additive representative function a(vi ,X alli (vi ,v˜−i ), ·), such
that a(vi ,X alli (vi ,v˜−i ), {j}) = SWBj (vi ,v˜−i ). Let
Si (vi ,v−i ,v˜−i ,Z ) := X alli (vi ,v˜−i ) ∩ Λi (v<i ,Z )
be the items in X alli (vi ,v˜−i ) that buyer i may choose from under valuation prolev . As i chooses
a bundle Bi (v,Z ) ∈ D (vi ,p,Λi (v<i ,Z )) that maximises her utility, and Si (vi ,v−i ,v˜−i ,Z ) is in
Di (vi ,p,Λi (v<i ,Z )), it follows that i’s utility for Bi (v,Z ) is at least the utility she would get for
choosing Si (vi ,v−i ,v˜−i ,Z ). at is, for allv and Z ⊆ H
vi (Bi (v,Z )) −
∑
j ∈Bi (v,Z )
pj ≥ Ev˜−i
vi (Si (vi ,v−i ,v˜−i ,Z )) −
∑
j ∈Si (vi ,v−i ,v˜−i ,Z )
pj

≥ Ev˜−i

∑
j ∈Si (vi ,v−i ,v˜−i ,Z )
(a(vi ,X
all
i (vi ,v˜−i ), {j}) − pj )

= Ev˜−i

∑
j ∈Si (vi ,v−i ,v˜−i ,Z )
(SWBj (vi ,v˜−i ) − pj )
 .
e second-to-last inequality follows from the denition of the corresponding additive function
a(vi ,X
all
i (vi ,v˜−i ), ·); that is, vi (S ) ≥ a(vi ,X alli (vi ,v˜−i ),S ) for all S ⊆ [k].
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Now summing the above expression over all i ∈ [n] and taking the expectation overv and Z , we
get
Ev,Z

n∑
i=1
*.,vi (Bi (v,Z )) −
∑
j ∈Bi (v,Z )
pj
+/-
 ≥ Ev,v˜−i ,Z

n∑
i=1
∑
j ∈Si (vi ,v−i ,v˜−i ,Z )
(SWBj (vi ,v˜−i ) − pj )

= Ev,v˜−i ,Z

n∑
i=1
∑
j ∈H
(SWBj (vi ,v˜−i ) − pj )
·I[j ∈ X alli (vi ,v˜−i )]I[j ∈ Λi (v<i ,Z )]
 .
Note that we exploited the independence of the events (j ∈ X alli (vi ,v˜−i )) and (j ∈ Λi (v<i ,z)). us,
switching the order of the sums and using linearity of expectation, we get that
Ev,Z

n∑
i=1
*.,vi (Bi (v,Z )) −
∑
j ∈Bi (v,Z )
pj
+/-

≥
∑
j ∈H
n∑
i=1
Prv,Z [j ∈ Λi (v<i ,Z )]Evi ,v˜−i [(SWBj (vi ,v˜−i ) − pj )I[j ∈ X alli (vi ,v˜−i )]]
≥
∑
j ∈H
Prv,Z [j ∈ Λn+1 (v,Z )]
n∑
i=1
Ev [(SWBj (v ) − pj )I[j ∈ X alli (v )]]
=
∑
j ∈H
Prv,Z [j ∈ Λn+1 (v,Z )]pj
=
∑
j ∈H
Prv,Z [j ∈ Λn+1 (v,Z ) | j ∈ Z ]Pr[j ∈ Z ]pj
=
1
2
∑
j ∈H
Prv,Z [j ∈ Λn+1 (v,Z ) | j ∈ Z ]pj .
For the rst inequality, we simply renamed v˜−i = v−i since they are equally distributed (and so
equal under expectation) and then used (2). For the last one, we used the fact that for any i ∈ [n] it
holds that Prv [j ∈ Λi (v<i ,Z )] ≥ Prv [j ∈ Λn+1 (v,Z )]. 
Proposition B.2. e expected sum of the payments charged byM1-supply to the buyers is equal to
E

∑
i ∈[n]
ρBi
 =
1
2
∑
j ∈H
pjPrv,Z [j < Λn+1 (v,Z ) | j ∈ Z ]
Proof. e revenue extracted by the mechanism, meaning the sum of the payments charged to
the buyers, is equal to∑
j ∈H
pjPrv,Z [j < Λn+1 (v,Z ) ∧ j ∈ Z ] =
∑
j ∈H
pjPrv,Z [j < Λn+1 (v,Z ) | j ∈ Z ]Pr[j ∈ Z ]
=
1
2
∑
j ∈H
pjPrv,Z [j < Λn+1 (v,Z ) | j ∈ Z ].

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We now prove Lemma 4.3 using the above two propositions. Observe that the buyers’ contribution
to the social welfare ALGB extracted byM1-supply is equal to the sum of all the buyers’ utilities and
all the buyers’ payments.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. As just observed above, from Proposition B.1 and Proposition B.2, we
have that
ALGB = E

∑
i ∈[n]
ui (M1-supply (v,w ))
 +
∑
j ∈H
pjPrv,Z [j < Λn+1 (v,Z ) ∧ j ∈ Z ]
≥ 12
∑
j ∈H
Prv,Z [j ∈ Λn+1 (v,Z ) | j ∈ Z ]pj + 12
∑
j ∈H
pjPrv,Z [j < Λn+1 (v,Z ) | j ∈ Z ]
=
1
2
∑
j ∈H
pj =
1
4
∑
j ∈H
E[SWBj (v )].
By denition of L, for each j ∈ L it holds that 4E[w j ] > E[SWBj (v )]. Every item in L stays unsold
so,
ALGS ≥
∑
j ∈L
E[w j ] >
1
4
∑
j ∈L
E[SWBj (v )].
erefore,
ALGB + ALGS ≥ 14
k∑
j=1
E[SWBj (v )].
Now recall that E[SWBj (v )] was dened by the allocation X all (v ), being the one returned by
Algorithm A. So,
1
4
k∑
j=1
E[SWBj (v )] =
1
4
n∑
i=1
Ev [vi (X alli (v ))] ≥
1
4α OPT
B .

B.2 Proof of Proposition 5.5
Proposition B.3. Letv be a buyers’ valuation function prole and let (X ′1, . . . ,X ′n ) be any allocation
of items to the buyers, let X ′i,j := X ′i ∩Hj be the set of items in H that are allocated to buyer i ∈ [n]
and belonged to seller j ∈ [m]. For each seller j ∈ [m], let zj ∈ {0,1} be a Bernoulli random variable
such that E[zj ] = 1/2. Let X ′′i (z) :=
⋃
j ∈[m]:zj=1X
′
i,j for all i ∈ [n]. en, for all i ∈ [n] it holds that
Ez [vi (X ′′i (z))] ≥
1
2vi (X
′
i ).
Moreover, given any vector p ∈ Rk of item prices, the inequality also holds on the utilities of the buyers:
Ez
vi (X ′′i (z)) −
∑
`∈X ′′i (z )
p`
 ≥
1
2
*.,vi (X ′i ) −
∑
`∈X ′i
p`
+/- .
Proof. For the rst claim, rst note that due to subadditivity
Ez [vi (X ′′i (z))] ≥ vi (X ′i ) − Ez
vi
*.,
⋃
j ∈[m]:zj=0
X ′i,j
+/-
 .
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Observe that
Ez [vi (X ′′i (z))] = Ez
vi
*.,
⋃
j ∈[m]:zj=1
X ′i,j
+/-
 = Ez
vi
*.,
⋃
j ∈[m]:zj=0
X ′i,j
+/-
 ,
because the events zj = 0 and zj = 1 are equiprobable for all j ∈ [m]. Combining this with the
above inequality establishes the rst claim.
e second claim follows from the following derivation.
Ez
vi (X ′′i (z)) −
∑
`∈X ′′i (z )
p`
 = Ez [vi (X ′′i (z))] − Ez

∑
j ∈[m]:zj=1
∑
`∈X ′i,j
p`

= Ez [vi (X ′′i (z))] − Ez

m∑
j=1
*..,
∑
`∈X ′i,j
p`
+//- I[zj = 1]

= Ez [vi (X ′′i (z))] −
m∑
j=1
*..,
∑
`∈X ′i,j
p`
+//-Ez
[
I[zj = 1]
]
= Ez [vi (X ′′i (z))] −
∑
`∈X ′i
p`
1
2
≥ 12vi (X
′
i ) −
1
2
∑
`∈X ′i
p`

Proposition B.4. Let j ∈ [m] be a seller. e probability that the mechanismMadd makes in Step
7c an oer to j that she accepts, is 1/2.
Proof. For every j ∈ [m] and ` ∈ Hj , it holds by denition of p` and Hj that p` ≥ 2E[w j ({`})].
From Markov’s inequality it follows that
Pr
w j (S j ) >
∑
`∈Sj
p`
 ≤ Pr[w j (S j ) > 2E[w j (S j )]] <
1
2 .
us, Pr
[
w j (S j ) ≤ ∑`∈Sj p`] ≥ 1/2, meaning that j accepts the oer with probability at least 1/2,
in case she is made an oer. e mechanism makes the oer with probability qj , and qj is dened
such that
qjPr
w j (S j ) ≤
∑
`∈Sj
p`
 = 1/2.

For i ∈ [n + 1] and valuation prole v , let v<i = (v1, . . . ,vi−1) and let Λi (v<i ) be the set Λi
dened in Step 5b, whenMadd is run when the buyers in [i − 1] have valuation prolev<i . Given
this denition, the set Λn+1 (v ) are the items not requested by any buyer at the end of Step 5, when
the buyers’ valuation prole isv .
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Lemma B.5. e expected total utility of the buyers is at least
1
2
∑
`∈H
Prv [` ∈ Λn+1 (v )]p` .
Proof. First, let us consider a xed buyer i ∈ [n] and a xed buyers’ valuation prole v . Let
v˜−i be an independently sampled valuation prole for the buyers in [n] \ {i}, and consider the
bundle X alli (vi ,v˜−i ) that A allocates to i when the valuation prole is (vi ,v˜−i ). Let XHi (v,v˜−i ) =
X alli (vi ,v˜−i )∩H ∩Λi (v<i ). Moreover, let z be a vector ofm Bernoulli random variables with E[zj ] =
1/2 and dene for a subset S (v ) ⊆ Λi (v ) the random variable S (v,z) = ⋃j ∈[m]:zj=1 (S ∩Hj ). Partic-
ularly, from this denition we obtain the random variable Xi (v,v˜−i ,z) =
⋃
j ∈[m]:zj=1 (X
H
i (v,v˜−i ) ∩
Hj ). Also, note that when the buyers’ valuations arev , the mechanism will let i choose to request
a bundle from the set Λi (v<i ) with item prices p. e buyer maximises her expected utility and
will therefore request the bundle Bi (v ) that maximises her expected utility, i.e.,
Ez
vi (B (v,z)) −
∑
`∈B (v,z )
p`
 .
By Proposition B.4 each seller’s requested items will be allocated with probability 1/2, as reected
by the Bernoulli random variables z.
Since Bi (v ) is an expected utility-maximising bundle and Xi (v,v˜−i ,z) ⊆ Λi (v ) is selectable by i ,
it holds that
Ez
vi (B (v,z)) −
∑
`∈B (v,z )
p`
 ≥ Ev˜−i ,z
vi (Xi (v,v˜−i ,z)) −
∑
`∈Xi (v,v˜−i ,z )
p`

≥ 12Ev˜−i
vi (X
H
i (v,v˜−i )) −
∑
`∈X Li (v,v˜−i )
p`

≥ 12Ev˜−i
a(vi ,X
all
i (vi ,v−i ),X
H
i (v,v−i )) −
∑
`∈XHi (v,v˜−i )
p`

=
1
2Ev˜−i

∑
`∈XHi (v,v˜−i )
(SWB` (vi ,v˜−i ) − p` )
 .
where the second inequality follows from Proposition B.3, and the last inequality follows from the
denition of the additive representative function a(vi ,X alli (vi ,v˜−i , ·).
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If we sum over all i ∈ [n] and take the expectation w.r.t. every vi , we obtain the following bound
on the total expected utility of the buyers.
Ev,z

n∑
i=1
(vi (B (v,z)) −
∑
`∈B (v,z )
p` )
 ≥
1
2Ev,v˜−i

n∑
i=1
∑
`∈XHi (v,v˜−i )
(SWB` (vi ,v˜−i ) − p` )

=
1
2Ev,v˜−i

n∑
i=1
∑
`∈H
(SWB` (vi ,v˜−i ) − p` )I[` ∈ XHi (v,v˜−i )]

=
1
2Ev,v˜−i

n∑
i=1
∑
`∈H
(SWB` (vi ,v˜−i ) − p` )I[` ∈ X alli (vi ,v˜−i )]I[` ∈ Λi (v<i )]

=
1
2
∑
`∈H
n∑
i=1
Evi ,v˜−i
[
(SWB` (vi ,v˜−i ) − p` )I[` ∈ X alli (vi ,v˜−i )]
]
Ev−i [I[` ∈ Λi (v<i )]] .
For the second-to-last equality, we exploited the independence of the events (` ∈ X alli (vi ,v˜−i ))
and (` ∈ Λi (v<i )). en, Ev−i [I[` ∈ Λi (v<i )]] = Pr[` ∈ Λi (v<i )] and since L = Λ1 (v<1) ⊇ . . . ⊇
Λn+1 (v ), it holds that Pr[` ∈ Λi (v<i )] ≥ Pr[` ∈ Λn+1 (v )]. So, we have that the above expression is
at least
1
2
∑
`∈H
Prv [` ∈ Λn+1 (v )]
n∑
i=1
Evi ,v˜−i [(SW
B
` (vi ,v˜−i ) − p` )I[` ∈ X alli (vi ,v˜−i )]]
=
1
2
∑
`∈H
Prv [` ∈ Λn+1 (v )]
n∑
i=1
Ev [(SWB` (v ) − p` )I[` ∈ X alli (v )]].
e equality follows from renaming the random variable vj := v˜j for all j , i Now observe that by
denition of the prices, p` =
∑n
i=1 Ev [(SWB` (v ) − p` )I[` ∈ X alli (v )]]. Combining these derivations,
we obtain the desired bound on the expected utilities
Ev,z

n∑
i=1
(vi (B (v,z)) −
∑
`∈B (v,z )
p` )
 ≥
1
2
∑
`∈H
Prv [` ∈ Λn+1 (v )]p` .

Lemma B.6. e expected sum of payments made by the buyers is equal to
1
2
∑
`∈H
Prv [` < Λn+1 (v )]p` .
Proof. For j ∈ [m], let zj be the random (0,1)-variable that indicates whether seller j has been
made an oer and accepted it in Step 7c of MechanismMadd, so zj = 1 is a Bernoulli variable with
expected value 1/2. e expected sum of payments made by the buyers is then
m∑
j=1
∑
`∈Hj
Pr[` < Λn+1 (v ) ∧ zj = 1]p` =
m∑
j=1
∑
`∈Hj
Pr[` < Λn+1 (v )]Pr[zj = 1]p`
=
1
2
m∑
j=1
∑
`∈Hj
Pr[` < Λn+1 (v )]p`
=
1
2
∑
`∈H
Pr[` < Λn+1 (v )]p`
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e second equality holds by the independence of the two events. 
Proof of Proposition 5.5. e expected social welfare contribution of the buyers is equal to
the sum of the expected utilities and expected payments. By the above two lemmas, their sum is at
least
1
2
∑
`∈H
Pr[` ∈ Λn+1 (v )]p` + 12
∑
`∈H
Pr[` < Λn+1 (v )]p` =
1
2
∑
`∈H
p` =
1
4
∑
`∈H
Ev [SWB` (v )],
by denition of p` . 
